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Poiesis and Politics as Ecstatic Fetish: 
Foucault’s Ethical Demand*
“Seduction is not a passive form of incitem ent.” 
M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, pp. 95-6
Toward the end of his third volume on the History of Sexuality, where 
upon he expressly links the “art of living” with the care of oneself, Foucault 
invites us to think through the moral and ethical implications of such a con 
nection. It is a troubled connection, indeed, a dangerous path, and we are 
forewarned o f the trouble ahead. “...[A]s the arts of living and the care of 
the self are refined,” says Foucault, “some precepts emerge that seem to be 
ra ther similar to those that will be formulated in the later moral systems.
But one should no t be misled by the analogy. Those moral systems will 
define o ther modalities of the relation to self: a characterization of the ethi 
cal substance based on finitude, the Fall, and evil; a mode of subjection in 
the form of obedience to a general law that is at the same time the will for 
a personal god; [...] a m ode of ethical fulfilment that tends toward self-re- 
nunciation. (Foucault, 1988: 239-40).
At the risk of too rapidly citing these dangers or stating their implica 
tions in too coarse a way, here is what lies at the heart of the matter: on the 
face of it, comparisons of apples and oranges do not -  because they cannot -  
yield the same fruit. But why not? What is it that makes this comparison un 
tenable?
It is no t enough to point out the obvious, says Foucault; to wit: that these 
‘latter [judeo-christian] systems’, these ‘modalities’ might sound like, might 
even appear similar to, earlier modalities touching upon body and soul and 
the relations therein or thereabouts ascribed -  but now, given a ‘different’ 
socialized horizontal history we might call ‘the Law’ (whether that Law be 
reconstituted with a different set of markers: the singularity of God, or rea 
son or renunciation or madness or whatever), that these comparisons must 
now come to an abrupt halt. Would it to be that there could be a transcen 
* An ea rlie r  version o f this essay was p resen ted  at the L ondon (UK) Foucault 
Conference, Ju n e  25, 1994 and at the International Congress of Michel Foucault, 
organized by Professor Paul Bouissac, University of Toronto and the Institut Michel 
Foucault [Paris], on Oct. 12-16,1994, Toronto, Canada. T hat version, entitled, “The 
Politics o f Foucault’s Poetics, or, better yet: the ethical dem and of ecstatic fetish,” 
was subsequently published as part of the conference proceedings in j. Squires (ed.), 
“J ’accuse”, New Formations, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, May 1995). This is an 
enlarged version of the original article.
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dental move or over-arching archimedean point, i.e., some kind o f ‘outside’, 
however opaque or permeable or dynamic, that would allow us to decipher 
the belonging-together, the identity and, hence the comparison (or indeed, 
the dissimilarity), of these modalities.1 No, this is no t why they are incom  
parable. Nor, on the o ther hand, is it enough to suspend a com parative 
association out of some kind of (formal) onto-theo-logical disengagem ent 
from the very concept of identity/difference and the dialectical contradic 
tion or limit therein implied or so synthesized, whilst retaining the very meta 
physics of transcendence itself.
No.
These comparisons cannot be made, as such, because a something ‘else’ 
or something ‘other’ is at play in Foucault’s work, an elsewhere or otherness 
that is located precisely in the very parenthesis of representation; that is, in 
the nomadic ‘in between’ of the limit; in the unchartered and multiple (but 
no less specific) distancings an d /o r  journeyings required to make an iden 
tity, and therewith, a naming, a meaning -  a ‘some kind of’ truth -  possible.2
1 Though Foucault will develop the question -  and the actuality -  o f identity along 
quite a different route than that of his philosophic predecessor, we could also take 
some cues from  Heidegger on this point: “If  we th ink of belonging together in the 
customary way,” says Heidegger, “the m eaning o f being is determ ined  by the word 
together, that is, by its unity. In that case, ‘to belong’ m eans as m uch as: to be 
assigned and placed into the order of a ‘toge ther’, established in the unity o f a 
manifold, com bined into the unity of a system, m ediated by the unifying cen ter o f an 
authoritative synthesis. Philosophy represents this belonging together as nexus and 
connexio, the necessary connection of the one with the other. However, belonging 
together can also be thought of as belonging together. This means: the “toge ther” is 
now determ ined by the belonging ... T hat is how things look -  until we take a closer 
look and let the m atter speak for itself.” (H eidegger 1969: 29).
2 We will return  to this claim shortly when discussing Foucault’s notion of a conversio ad 
se, developed mainly in the History of Sexuality, vol. Ill; i.e., the transform ation o f the 
self; its creation/m aking/inventing of “self-hoodedness” (self-mastery of the self-to- 
self relation). Perhaps it is worth m entioning that this kind of d istancing/spacing 
(which begins to produce a wholly different concept of otherness) can be found 
th roughout his work -  certainly the same them es resonate in his in troduction  to 
Herculine Barbine (1980); or in his work on transgression (Foucault 1977) or his 
imaginary dialogues with Blanchot (Foucault 1987a); o r in his remarks on rationality/ 
truth games. For further reference to his developm ent and use o f fluidity and 
discontinuity, and the ‘distancing’ this requires and exploits for these truth-identity 
relations, see for example, his Death and the Labyrinth (Foucault 1987b); “Politics and 
the Study o f Discourse,” and “The Problem  Rationalities,” (Burchell, e t al. 1991: 53- 
72; esp. 79-82, respectively); “Truth and Power,” (Foucault 1972). O n the o ther hand, 
perhaps it is also worth m entioning tha t by finding these threads th roughou t his 
work, this ‘find’ is not m eant to imply that ‘he always already knew what he was trying 
to say’ and then just went about and said it, so that his work m ight be in te rp re ted  as
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Indeed , this som ething else or som ething o ther is ra ther m ore like the 
unnam eable space or dom ain of knowledge, self-knowledge, captured by 
Foucault in reference to Plato’s m etaphor of the eye:
‘How can the eye see itself?’ [Plato asks]. The answer is apparently very 
simple, bu t in fact it is very complicated. For Plato, one cannot simply look 
at oneself in a m irror. O ne has to look into another eye, that is, one in 
oneself, however in oneself in the shape of the eye of the other. (Foucault 
1984a: 367)
Here we begin to find clues for a different articulation of self-forma 
tion/self-knowledge, one which is formed, of necessity, from an ‘o ther’ re 
lation, no t quite specified. Yet rather than the supposed deep and violent 
cu t of identity drawn from  exile or negation, for Foucault it will be but a 
queer and superficial wound; or, perhaps better put, it will be but a meta 
morphosis o f surface distances, whose ‘o ther’ meaning is not constituted by 
recourse to a mediation born of contradiction -  dialectic or otherwise. Like 
the gaping, open m outh of a pig before slaughter (is she laughing out of 
ignorance; is she screaming out of knowledge -  maybe she is doing both, at 
exactly the same time) ,3 the perpetual corruption of an edge or boundary 
that stands neither as an ‘outside’ nor as an ‘in ’ to any language-game, now 
quietly replaces what was once considered the absolute necessity of concep 
tualizing any identity -  symbolic, real, or imagined; to wit, the im-mediate 
“/ “ of the e ither/o r.
And yet, this som ething else or something other is no t simply a ‘trace’ 
o f the not-nam eable representation standing before, beyond or beside the 
Law. N or for that m atter is it ‘difference’, if, by difference, we mean to say 
‘not-the-same’. Nor, finally, is it ‘lack’, if by lack we m ean an incommensu 
rable ‘empty space’ waiting to be filled. Apologies to Baudrillardians and 
Lacanians on this score, bu t this something else or something other is not a 
trace or a lack at all; no r is it an abyss, a shame, an embarrassment, an er 
ror, a negation, a castration, a sacramental rite, celebration or void. For we
though it were one long univocal proposition or even celebration regarding sex, 
identity, politics -  indeed, life itself. As one of the few creative intellectuals of our 
tim e — one whose intellectual work was also his artistry and, not surprisingly, his 
passion -  Foucault had the creative nerve to deduce new propositions from his 
various works and, by way o f example, encouraged others to do so too. “Leave it to 
the police and bureaucrats to see that our papers are in o rd er”; he once chillingly 
threw back at the academ ic posers,”at least spare us their morality when we write”.
3 T he image o f the gaping w ound as smiling pig as (morbid) metam orphosis was first 
brought to my attention  th rough the wonderfully unconventional writines of Irvins 
Massey (1976).
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are not dealing with representation, as in identity, in any of its symbolic order 
or symbolic disarray. Nor are we dealing with a representation around which 
an x or y can be reproduced or deduced or induced, leaving, in its wake, a 
rem ainder tout cout.
Something much more excessive, or ungrateful and greasy, som ething 
much m ore melancholic, subtle, and  in some ways, m ore precarious, is 
nagging at the skin of our so-called (and seemingly no t com parable) fruit. 
Rather than the bold and sweeping morass of dialectical contradiction (sub 
jectivity v. objectivity -  and the transcendentalism this implies -  be dam ned!), 
Foucault is insisting upon an ‘o th e r’ as a ‘som ething else’, a bios, whose 
porous-like creation or invention, whose multiple-singularity is itself contou 
red by, while simultaneously contouring, the very processes (reciprocal, 
wandering, m annered) of tradition, custom, habit (1984a:344-51). To put 
this slightly differently, this strange kind of ‘otherness’ refuses the neat one- 
to-one singularity/identity  ratio o f tru th  (m eta-narrative o r otherw ise), 
wherein the ‘o ther’ comes to mean that which does n o t quite ‘correspond’ 
or ‘fit in ’. Indeed, this ‘otherness’ is completely at odds with one that m ight 
imply or m ean a ‘not-of-the-Something’ -  a po in t Foucault stresses often 
enough when writing directly on sex a n d /o r  sex-as-gender. O therness, the 
other, etc., cannot be reduced to o r be equated  with or seen as circum  
scribing the identity of ‘those who do no t fit in ’: the (straight) woman, the 
homosexual, the herm aphrodite, or all three.4 No m ore is otherness m eant 
as the negatively configured, excessive ‘blip’ on the screen o f dialectics, than 
is it m eant to uncover the true, point-for-point, identity of Truth, and there 
with, of any identity, be that identity secret or wrong or even the norm .5 
Unlike the glib proclamation, which in days (not yet) gone by announced,
4 Foucault is basically attacking the widespread but no less facile tendency o f those 
political philosophies which forward in one way or an o th er (either fo r progressive 
reasons or not) the concept o f those who ‘do no t fit in ’ (which include, also: the 
Jews, people of colour, travellers, etc.). In reality those theories only take as a given 
exactly what they are trying to prove (around oppression, who is ‘the enem y’ and so 
forth). Interestingly enough, Adorno (1966) makes a similar point in his “Critique o f 
Positive Negation,” though, unlike Foucault, A dorno tries to rescue the negative 
from a hegelian positivity and poorly understood  freudianism , w herein for exam ple, 
‘woman’, becomes ‘o ther’, and, in more contem porary times, as the female ‘castrated’ 
container (as it were) always-already p itted  against and subsum ed in term s of the 
‘phallic-m ale’ real. “Against this,” says A dorno, “the seriousness o f unswerving 
negation lies in its refusal to lend itself to sanctioning things as they are.” (Adorno 1966: 
159) [my emphasis]. See also my “Curiosity,” (Golding: 1995), where this po in t is 
detailed m ore extensively.
5 For a glimpse into Foucault’s developm ent o f the concept o f o ther in relation to the 
identity as one which eo ipso rejects ‘o therness’ as an ‘e rro r,’ at least “as understood
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“Wake up, young people from your illusory pleasures; strip off your disguises 
and recall that every one of you has a sex, a true sex” (Foucault 1980: x), 
there is no ‘true sex’ nor its exiled relative, the ‘o ther’. There is simply the 
‘strange history’ of people who insist that this is so.
If that be the case -  if, that is to say, it is not the ‘outside’ negation of a 
that-which-lies-around-us -  then what constitutes Foucault’s handling of 
‘o ther/excess’? In one word, though many more will follow, it is techne, in 
deed, a peculiar re-invention of the term, wherein techne becomes also the 
strategy o f techne; a strategy of compulsion (as in: to compel) ; a strategy of 
style and m anners (as in: to charm not without pleasure and attention to 
detail, to have grace, savoir faire) ; it is a strategy of use (as in to handle and 
be handled; to utilize; to exercise, exhaust; to corrupt; to resist; to invoke 
pleasure or pain or b o th ). In short, it is a strategy of seduction.6 For let there 
be no mistake about it, this otherness points to a stylistics of existence, a ‘being 
used’, in the most profane and corrupting senses of the phrase: lying to hand. 
And yet, we are rather far away from Heidegger’s techne as a transcendent 
“looking out beyond what is given at any time” (and the heterogeneous sense 
of time clipped out at the expense of ‘space’) .7 We are even further from its
in the most traditionally philosophic sense: a m anner of acting that is not adequate to 
reality,” see his fun little introduction in HercutineBarbin (Foucault 1980: x).
6 This po in t will be played out in greater detail momentarily. But see in particular 
Foucault’s, “Why the A ncient World Was Not a Golden Age, But What We Can Learn 
From  It Anyway,” “The Structure of Genealogical Interpretation ,” and “From the 
Classical Self to the M odern Subject (all in 1984a: esp. pp. 348-51; 353-58; 361-68, 
respectively) and “The Cultivation of The Self,” “Self and O thers,” “The Body,” (1988: 
Parts II, III, and IV).
7 From  H eidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961) as quoted in Fynsk (1993: 
p. 120). Fynsk, in succinctly extrapolating upon H eidegger’s use of techne, clearly 
maps out the way in which that usage leads squarely back to the negation, the disaster, 
the error, the wronged, and so on. He writes, in part: “‘Techne’ Heidegger defines 
as ‘know ledge’: the transcendent ‘looking out beyond what is given at any time, by 
which the Being of what is is disclosed and realized -  opened and held open -  in the 
work as a being. Techne, H eidegger says, provides the basic trait of deinon in the 
sense o f ‘the v io len t’...Man is deinon in that he moves in the violent action of 
‘m achination’ ( mechanoen) that Heidegger defines in terms of techne, but man is the 
strangest o r most uncanny (to deino tation), in that in his opening of paths in all the 
realms o f being, he is constantly ‘issueless’: ‘he becomes the strangest o f all beings 
because, w ithout issue on all paths, he is cast out of every relation to the familiar and 
befallen by ate, ruin, catastrophe.’ ...Man is ‘without issue on all paths’ because his 
violent and venturesom e way-making must shatter against death, ‘this strange and 
uncanny th ing  that banishes us once and for all from everything in which we are at 
hom e.’... As m an ventures to m aster being in techne, he constantly stands before the 
possibility o f death. To stand before death is fundamentally to stand in the possibility
21
Sue Golding
Benthamite predecessor of a p leasure/pain  utility.8 For the physicality of 
this terrain  (if, indeed , there  is a singularly d im ensional te rra in ) , its 
‘materiality’ emerges out of, and byway of, the so-called ‘in betw een’ o f the 
stitched together discourse, the fleeting in between of an infinitely beating 
strange-time called ‘the present’ (despite the fact this entire rem ark has been 
resting on pre-the Christian martyrdom). In philosophic prose, it is a mi 
metic re-presenting of the present around which this something else or some 
thing other is created by virtue of its being there (as in: ‘over th e re ’, ‘over 
he re ’ and the relative webbings and weaves in between and around  that t /  
here) -  to which our varied customs, m anners and so on, perm it us -  and 
indeed, dem and of us -  to make use.
That is to say, then, that this ‘o th er’ self/identity  self becomes, simply, 
the expression of multi-particled selfnesses, m ade meaningful, m ade into a 
something ‘else’ -  a kind of gaseous ‘nodal po in t’ of self -  due precisely to 
its having been attracted/seduced, and therewith, sutured, into a oneness 
(of sorts) no t because of beauty (per se) or desire (per se) or even m agnet 
ism (per se) but precisely because it can be -  and m ust be -  used. Techne. 
Cohesive relations, processes, wanderings, traditions, fleeting nodal points, 
dreams, even the sweat (or especially the sweat) of the body loins, are all 
grist for the mill, all ‘props’ for establishing the multiple-as-a-singular-unity, 
establishing, in other words, the that which lies around us, the elsewhere or 
otherness, as us; but an ‘us’ as ‘selfhood’ quite distinct from  the wholly- 
formed Truth of the Cartesian ego-I, self-reflexive sense o f self. “If A = A as
of disaster -  downfall into the placeless and issueless, the event o f Umheimlichkeit itself. 
... Disaster, then, is not only possible, it is necessary. Man is driven to assume his 
essence as Dasein in techne by Being that requires a place of disclosure.” (Fynsk 1993: 
pp. 120-21).
8 O f course, as is well-known from  his Principles of Morals and Legislation, B en tham ’s 
utilitarianism, and the notions o f ‘use’ and ‘usefulness’ tha t stem from  this, operates 
by way of a zero-sum game of pleasure and pain, or, what he calls the ag ression / 
resistance principle of physics (Bentham 1988: see chapters III-V). This presupposes, 
amongst o ther things, a fully form ed cogito, and a self-reflexive self, whose self- 
hoodedness (self-mastery of the becom ing o f self) is based on the concept that being 
is intrinsically ‘good’. But to accept this, is also then to take as a given tha t reality is 
p rec ise ly -and  only -  the reality of each individual p erse . At the end of the day, this 
would mean, finally, that ‘use’ a n d /o r  ‘discovery’ (techne) would encom pass the 
(individual) desire of her or his own pleasure for its own sake. O r to put this slightly 
differently, it would be to accept that, as the hum an animal is intrinsically benevolent, 
yet this benevolence only exists to the degree to which whatever we may do (for o r to 
each o ther), we would do it to advance ourselves first and foremost: the ‘use’ of a 
thing would be judged  accordingly. Foucault is not invoking or even h in ting  at this 
type of ‘use’.
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an identity is reform ulated as I = I (Fichte),” concludes Joan Stambaugh in 
her in troduction to H eidegger’s Identity and Difference, “and by Schelling as 
‘m ore precisely the indifference of the subject to the object’,” (Heidegger 
1969), we can say that for Foucault, it is no more nor less than a path or 
field of com pressed/ m ultiple [relative] relations informed, conformed, 
indeed reform ed as a kind of double headed arrow of I-selfs < -  > I-selfs. 
Foucault puts it like this:
“In  E p ic te tu s  th e re  a re  2 exercises: soph istic  an d  e th ica l. T h e  first 
b o rro w ed  from  school: question-and-answ er gam es. [...] T he second 
a re  am b u la to ry  exercises. In  the  m o rn in g  you go fo r  a walk an d  test 
your reactions to  th a t walk. T he purpose o f bo th  exercises is con tro l of 
re p re s e n ta t io n s , n o t  th e  d e c ip h e rin g  o f  tru th . T hey  a re  rem in d e rs  
a b o u t con fo rm ing  to  the  rules in the face o f adversity. [...] For Epictetus, 
th e  c o n tro l o f  re p re se n ta tio n s  m eans n o t d e c ip h e rin g  b u t recalling  
p rin c ip les  o f  ac ting  an d  thus seeing, th ro u g h  self-exam ination, if  they 
govern  you r life. I t is a k in d  o f p e rm a n e n t self-exam ination . [But in 
th e  en d ] You have to be your own censor." (Foucault in (M artin, e t al. 1988: 
p. 38, my italics)).
This ‘kind of perm anent self-examination’ and ‘self-censorship’ is what 
Foucault short-hands as ‘technologies of the self ; i.e., a ‘logic of the techne,’ 
a logic of seductions (plural) of the self to the self which creates the necessary 
distance or path for a conversio ad se, a conversion of the selves into self as self. 
(Foucault 1988: p. 65ff; 1986: p. 29ff).9 In Foucault’s preliminary and ancient 
cartography of the self-to-self relation, this distance gained or accumulated 
amounts to (or circumscribes) nothing other than the social and constitutive 
self in its fluid fullness: where the other and its something come together to 
form a self-contained self; a self wherein finally “one ‘belongs to [one] se lf,” 
says Foucault, where “one is ‘his own master’; one is answerable only to one 
self, one is suijuris; one exercises over oneself an authority that nothing limits 
or threatens; one holds the potestas sui.” (Foucault 1988: p. 65, my empha 
sis).10 Indeed, this technology of the self is but a discursive human geogra 
phy, a kind of permeable civil fortress of self-hoodedness/self-mastery that not 
only emphasizes control in the sense of establishing a peculiar masterliness
9 In P art Two, “The Cultivation o f the Self,” he writes, “... one had best keep in mind 
tha t the chief objective one should set for oneself is to be sought within oneself, in 
the relation of oneself to oneself.” (1988: pp. 64-5). In the earlier referencing cited 
above (Foucault’s second volume to the History of Sexuality -  The Use of Pleasure), 
sim ilar them es are raised though here he is speaking of a ‘decipherm ent’ of the self 
by oneself, ra ther than the relation per se.
10 As Seneca writes: “The soul stands on unassailable grounds, if it has abandoned external 
things; it is independent in its own fortress; and every weapon that is hurled falls short 
o f the m ark.” (Seneca, Letters toLucilius) as quoted in Foucault (1988: pp. 82,5).
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of sorts that can defy limits or threats without, at the same time, incubating 
in its wake the hegelian predisposition o f the master/slave dialectic, bu t also 
emits of itself a specific ethics of control; the (ethical) control of the perpetual 
self-creating/self-inventing self.
How different is this from the cogito o f a Western metaphysics! How 
different is the fruit of this ‘otherness’ from the more contemporary attempts 
to which we have not only beared witness, bu t often assume!11
With this different use of reason, we have before us a beheaded rational 
mastery of self, a multiple personality order, controlling and controlled at 
the fleeting threshold of pleasured self-uses -  a m etam orphosis, a conversio 
ad se, a kind of flight of fancy nothing less than ‘ecstatic’ -  sans a teleological 
‘desire’ or transcendental ‘ought to b e ’.12 And yet, its transitory m om entum  
belies an oddly stable, though distinctly imaginative, m apping o f the self, 
which, in this read, becomes both infinitely changeable and rigidly concrete, 
circumscribing an impossible arena of both self-possession (as in ajuridical 
model of possession) and nomadic self-rule. For this is an “ecstatic flight,” 
as Bernauer casts it; a pleasured flight, which requires an entire prepara 
tion linking body with soul w ithout re fe re n t to the  W estern form s o f 
masterliness, in the nam e of the Father or of Desire or Lacuna o r Law. 
(Foucault 1984c: p. xiii). O ne’s time becomes “full time;” indeed, becomes 
focused, disciplined, dirty/gritty time, with the Oracle at Delphi -  ‘know 
thyself -  looming large. Indeed, in this m ultiple/singularity o f self, unified 
(if this be the word) by the peculiar seductive acts o f the ‘being used’, there 
is no space at all for the what will later be described by Nietzsche as “toxic 
time,” that is, the wasted, mediocre time, of the m odern self-reflexive Be- 
ing-as-Time.
The desiring subject is dead.
And in its wake, the pleasure/using ‘o ther’ of self-related-self re-emerges, 
one whose very relations invents/creates an ethics of pleasure, in the fullest 
sense of the phrase: to cultivate pleasure, be it raw pain, transformative, 
melancholic, meditative, nomadic. Foucault thus writes:
11 In responding to a query on ‘postm odernism ’, and w hether o r n o t the term  is worth 
keeping, Foucault raises the issue of how one ‘reads’ the d ifferent uses o f reason, its 
historical effects, its limits and its dangers. I po in t this out in o rder to underscore that 
by accepting or even paying attention to the ‘g reek’ conversio ad se, this is not m eant 
to imply or demand “some cheap [nostalgia for] some imaginary past form of happiness 
that people did not, in fact, have at all.” (Foucault 1984b: p .248). O n the o ther hand, 
it is not m eant to designate it as ‘w rong’ either. Indeed, there is no moralistic 
implication -  though, as one might already detect, an ethical one is ready to hand.
12 This point is made more forcefully in Jam es B ernauer’s excellent study on Foucault, 
especially in his chapter six, “Ecstatic T hinking” (1991: p p .171-84).
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“It was against the background of this cultivation of the self, of its themes 
and practices, that reflection on the ethics of pleasure developed in 
the first centuries of our era. As for the definition of the work that must 
be carried out on oneself, it too under [went], in the cultivation of the 
self, a certain modification: through the exercises of abstinence and 
control that constitute the required askesis, the place allotted to self- 
knowledge becomes more important. The tasks of testing oneself, 
examining oneself, monitoring oneself in a series of clearly defined 
exercises, makes the question of truth -  the truth concerning what one 
is, what one does, and what one is capable of doing -  central to the 
formation o f the ethical subject. Lastly, the end result of this elaboration is 
still and always, defined by the rule of the individual over himself. But 
this rule broadens into an experience in which the relation to self takes 
the form not only of a domination but also of an enjoyment without 
desire and without disturbance.” (1988: pp.67, 68)
This “ru le”, which broadens into an experience forms an ‘o ther/self 
(as the multiple-other-selves-of-the-that-which-lies-around-us), whose cohesive 
ness, in its m etam orphosing seduction, presences an ethics of self-creation. 
An ethics, as Foucault says, “which would not be their expression in the sphere 
of ideology; rather, [...] would constitute an original response to them, in 
the form o f a new stylistics of existence.” (Foucault 1988: p.71)
So it is that this fleeting relation of pleasure and its uses, this metamor 
phosis of self to self, is captured by Foucault with the term ‘stylistics of exist 
ence’, an ecstatic flight of invention -  and seduction -  which is no less than 
the ethico — political art o f carving out one’s life, should one be willing to 
journey  onto the surface of the risk. Its metonymic rhythms, its poetic beat- 
beatings -  repetitive, lyrical and distinct -  have no a priori moral agency, 
though its cohesive synthetics emit nothing short of an ethical demand, an 
ethical dem and m ade ‘rea l’ by virtue of its having been coagulated into a 
m ultiple som ething, whatever this something -  or for that matter, its multi 
plicity, may be. A politics of ‘making real’ at the level of otherness, if ever 
there was one.
All this may be very interesting for our ancient boys and girls adhering 
(or otherwise) to the dream  spaces of an Artemedorius or a Lucilius or a 
Seneca; bu t what does it have to do with us? The ‘us’ o f a judeo-christian- 
hindu-m oslem  worldly world? The ‘us’ of a capitalist and racist and sexist 
an d  hom ophob ic  and  he terophob ic  and genderphobic  world? For, as 
Nietzsche intones in his The Gay Science, and quite rightly, too:
“§152. The greatest change. -  The illumination and the colour of all things 
have changed. We no longer understand altogether how the ancients 
experienced what was most familiar and frequent -  for example, the 
day and waking. [...] Every wrong had a different effect on men’s feel 
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ings; fo r  on e  fea red  divine re tr ib u tio n  an d  n o t m ere ly  a civil p u n ish  
m en t a n d  dishonour. W hat was joy  in  ages w hen on e  believed in  devils 
an d  tem pters? W hat was passion w hen  o n e  saw d em o n s lying in  w ait 
nearby? W hat was philosophy w hen  d o u b t was ex p e rien c ed  as a sin o f  
the m ost dangerous k ind -  as sacrilege against e te rn a l love, as m istrust 
o f all th a t  was good , h igh , p u re , a n d  m e rc ifu l? ...” (N ie tzsche  1974: 
p p .196-7).
The first answer must include, as Gramsci would put it, this ‘com m on 
place’ remark: that as every philosophy brings with it layers of politics, and 
vice versa, it then also brings forward a specific set o f questions (and ‘an 
swers,’ no t to put too simplistic a spin on it) about being hum an, o f what 
this humanity consists, and what kind of societies should best prom ote what 
ever ‘is’ or ‘is to becom e’ the ‘is’; whatever, that is to say, is /to  becom e ‘nec 
essary. ’ If that be the case, it is entirely plausible to suggest that a self-reflex- 
ive unity (of self) has em bedded in it a certain set o f interests with respect to 
personhood, body, property, community, and the like. Conversely, it is 
equally plausible to suggest, then, that with quite a different concept o f self
-  one which is inherently multiple -  a whole series of ‘com m on places’ are 
re-mixed and re-masticated to inform yet another set of interests, a re-newed, 
re-packaged, resusicated set of interests time-travelled and squarely landing 
within the glories (or not) of an information-cybernetic age. A rather odd 
eternal return, one that holds out the promise o f a ‘som ething different.’ 
And yet, a small recourse to Nietzsche, once again, may be necessary.
“§158. A n  inconvenient trait. -  To find  everything p ro fo u n d  -  th a t is an  
in conven ien t trait. It m akes one stra in  o n e ’s eyes all th e  tim e, a n d  in  
the en d  one finds m ore th an  one m ig h t have w ished.” (N ietzsche 1974: 
p .198).
Second answer, then: Let us be very careful no t too strain too intently. 
Shall we ju st steal a small leaf from Foucault’s ‘book’, nodding to the infi 
nite quagmire of change and in attem pting to do so, avoid the profound? 
One step backward, two steps ahead: let us link Foucault’s no tion  of the 
ecstatic flight with the contemporary arm our of fetishistic play to create what 
could be called, conceptually or otherwise in our less-than-world-historic 
times, ‘ecstatic fetish’.
As we have seen, with this (seductive) notion of the ecstatic, a peculiar 
relation is formed based on the m ultiple singularity o f otherness which dis 
rupts, out of necessity, the convenience o f ‘e ith e r /o r ’ polarities (and with 
it, e ith e r/o r politics). For the “o ther” that an ecstatic self-to-self relation 
exposes, is at best a ‘quasi-negation’ that plays with, circumscribes, and dances 
across the surface of each and every limit. We find then, a kind of o therness/ 
identity, say for example, in being gay, that has little to do with being ‘an ti’-
26
Poiesis and Politics as Ecstatic Fetish Foucault’s Ethical Demand
its supposed polar opposite (in this case, the so-called straight). Instead it 
elucidates a concept of self-as-other; i.e., a self no longer singular, unified 
and whole, bu t eliding multiplicities, self-as-selves-in-the-plural, based on the 
erupting surfaces between and amongst ‘internal’ and ‘external’ polarities.
To be clear, and to have some fun (why not?), let’s move onto a queerer 
version of this thing called ‘fetish,’ and the ethics of multiplicity to which it 
may (or may not) speak -  resurrected and now laid out across the some 
what m asturbatory (but in any case no longer inconspicuous) use of the 
phrase ‘the relation of the self-to-the-self.’ For it can certainly be said that 
fetish/fetishism, whilst including, initiating or cementing codes of behaviour 
and dress sense, does so in a way that neither privileges nor ignores this 
m ultiple sense o f ‘otherness’ and with it, this multiple sense of excess whose 
‘negation’ is no longer to be sought in the contradiction of the limit, but 
indeed, its rupture. By saying this, I want to disengage the concept (and/or, 
indeed, the reality) of fetish from being thought of as a signifier of death or 
o f a failed m ourning or of a melancholia-writ-large-and-inescapable -  as one 
finds in contem porary remarks on the subject.13 I do not wish to say that 
fetish is no t at all connected to death or to grieving or to a weirdly cathected 
fashion sense -  it is ju st to say it is not connected like that.
If one follows Foucault’s general indications on the impossibility of 
hom ogeneous otherness and the like, we get a different read of the terrain. 
Fetish becomes a far m ore delicate, though like silk, rather durable, con 
struction. Fetish becomes a far more raw (and explicit) bleed, though like 
blood, changes colour the m om ent its presence surfaces to air. Fetish be 
comes a far m ore complicated joke -  some say a ‘compacted story’, funny 
and alive, though precisely and at the same time, rather desperate and cling 
ing, painful, stillborn, and even gut-wrenching. Laugh till she cried. (And 
then  cried for more?) Yes, why not?
For fetish, if it is anything at all, in at least being all these contradictory 
and m utating ‘doubles’, is precisely and only the multiple singularity of itself.
O ne could say it entails, inscribes and delimits a kind of ripped and 
shared herm aphrodism  (and I do not use this word lightly) which is not a 
m etaphor ‘standing in ’ for anything else. Neither is it an ‘empty’ container 
waiting to be filled by some endless struggle between this thing called, (for 
example) heterosexual desire, this thing called homosexual desire, and this
13 T he best exam ple o f this problem  can be found in Lorraine Gammon and Merja 
M akinen (1994); but we find it, albeit it much more complex and meaningful ways, in 
works as varied as F reud ’s initial (1905) “T hree Essay on Sexuality,” his “M ourning 
and M elancholia; and  most recently in Derrida (1986), “Like the Sound of the Sea 
Deep Within a Shell: Paul de M an,” pp. 155-249.
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thing called bisexual desire m utated into one pair o f rubber stockings, one 
certain 60’s hairstyle, one opened and  smiling o r to rtu red  m outh . The 
fedshization of these creatures: male, female, transgendered beings, h o m o / 
lesbo/bisexed erotics, hairstyles and hose, cannot quite be reduced, how 
ever microscopic, to some kind of im penetrable mass, stuck together and 
‘understood’ only in terms of their opposition, contradiction or annihila 
tion.
For its synthesis, its moment, is not a ‘som ething’ that can be flung open 
and brought to public light, public scrutiny or even public ‘liberation’. It is 
far too vampiric for all that. The m eaning of the fetish both disappears and 
hovers at the very instant it seems most near to hand. There are neither truths 
nor secrets in a fetish; no discovery, no  bringing to the surface its authentic 
point of departure; indeed, no ‘au then tic’ point at all. This does no t m ean 
that it is meaningless; or that it describes no limit or can be seen as an infi 
nite regression.
Rather, it is to say that fetish is the surface and the departure and the 
arrival; it’s whole point is that it is a squished up line at the very m om ent of 
its being a dot (an d /o r  vice versa: an elongated dot cleverly doubled as a 
line); a process and an end-point, endlessly processional and finitely punc 
tuated; the very threshold of a compacted story, a narrative that could never 
become ‘m eta’; never becom e ‘spectacle’ as such. Its presence, like all 
presents, is simply impossible (here, there, and gone at the exact same in 
stant); a virtual ‘to be’, a mastery o f the coming of masterliness. A radical 
mastery: being a perfectly im perfect autonom ous m astering, as de Sade 
would say, one without submission to a fixed and totalized Other. It is ra ther 
a virtual mastery, a radically impure mastery -  de-sanidzed over and  again 
on the slippery slope between and amongst the relation of self to self.
An obsessional, virtual, metonymic surface. An unreal (but, on the o ther 
hand, no less real), floating, magical, pleasure seeking surface, shot through 
with the absurdity of the cruel, of the dead, of the wronged. Isn’t life funny!? 
Isn’t life grand?! A cyberspace of present tense passion, of perpetual move 
m ent going nowhere in particular, bu t going there with speed and agility 
and attentiveness to detail, nonetheless. Not a becoming of self, not an imma 
nence as such; no t a telos unfolding either to the known or unknown tru th  
of self-awareness self; no t a Law because, by definition, Law (and therewith, 
truth). Simply a coming without the ‘b e ’; a coming without the identity rela 
tion of the ‘to be’; a coming to the surface of the present tense presence; 
superficiality in all its glory, re-making and re-presen£-ing the radical plural 
ity of self without recourse to the always already signed, sealed, and deliv 
ered self-given self.
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For fetish is simply, if it is anything at all, history with a Pop, the singu 
larly self-identified-self, blown to smithereens, undone and redone in the 
sacred image o f m utated  selves, cyber-selves; variegated selves of the re 
thought-out selves, ben t and re-designed in the instant coming of its come, 
by self-immolation self-exhibitionism, self-abuse, all fitted neatly into corset 
and collage. A m utilated series o f selves (any selves), a repetitive series of 
selves, well-rehearsed some m ight say (ritualised, most would say) through 
the m irrored multiplicity of space in between (and amongst) the snap-crackle- 
pop o f leather, latex and lace self forming selves.
Translation: No m ore ‘inside’ v. the ‘outside’ of individual body selves. 
No m ore self-reflexive self. Fetish as a kind of marker, horizon, even a kind 
o f ‘skin’ for the politically, emotionally liberal-impaired self; nothing more 
and nothing o ther than the infinite metamorphoses of the self into selves 
(or vice versa); the transformative mutations whose strange but somehow 
famil iar (though utterly unchartered) pluralities meld into oddly coher 
ent, albeit risky, wholes -  holographic wholes -  making metamorphosis, and 
with it, fetish, the very staff of identity itself. An identity which is no more or 
less than the excessive ecstatic flights of seduction in all its varying ‘o ther’ 
possibilities. Indeed, one could say that fetish is precisely the ‘o ther’ of Be 
ing, in all the m ultiple flawed and time worn senses of the verb: to be.
In the fetish world: a world that is not community and not geared to 
ward a ‘som ething’ (but is rather that heterogeneous sense of coded regu 
lations and conduct spoken o f earlier), we have before us then a peculiar 
imaginary of variegated impossibilities, an oozing excessivity of the self no 
longer outside the very processes of change, and therewith, no longer out 
side our grasp or reduced to a singular, opaque and unblemished purity. 
Could it no t be said, without overstating the case that we have the possibility 
(or anyway, ‘a ’ possibility) of routing out, if nothing else, a damning fascist 
logic o f the fixed whole-truth-and-nothing-but-the-truth-so-help-us-god moral 
ity. And in its place? A fleeting, mutinous, fetishized, politics of existence, a 
peculiar form  o f ethics: social and multiple, m annered and refined, con 
tinuous in its rupturing of the aesthetic form (though aesthetic nonetheless) ; 
a kind o f political-[aesthetic]-ethics whose integrity is graspable only at its 
m ultiple “o ther” crossing.
Ecstatic fetish: it is no t a Profound Thought worthy of grounding any 
vision. It is a small, fleeting, ethical dem and at the point of inventing the 
double joke of a m ultiple self: at the n e ith e r/n o r threshold of a fetish gone 
to light; at the n e ith e r/n o r  pleasure of the come.
A new dance step; a borrowed dance step; an old re-packaged dance 
step. Is this n o t precisely what a constant tango with ecstatic fetish -  the
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conversio ad se of our day and age -  invents, sweats out, [re-] presents, and
plays with, over and again? One small aspect o f contem porary resistance to
dom ination and insistence on change, no t to m ention: fun.
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